Ranking of Oligopolies in Developed Democracies: #1 Israel

The Evidence Is Overwhelming and Virtually Without Exception (1945–2025): Oligopolies in Developed Democracies Lead to Higher Consumer Prices. The Consumer Always Pays the Price.

“Tacit collusion can arise when firms interact repeatedly. They may then be able to maintain higher prices by tacitly agreeing that any deviation from the collusive scheme will trigger some retaliation.” (Marc Ivaldi, Bruno Jullien, Patrick Rey, Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, “The Economics of Tacit Collusion”, Final Report for DG Competition, European Commission, 2003)

Direct Quotations from the Most Authoritative Studies

1. De Loecker, Eeckhout & Unger (QJE 2020 + latest available update 2022)
   “In 1980, aggregate markups start to rise from 21% above marginal cost to 61% now. Rising concentration and reallocation to high-markup firms account for the vast majority of the observed increase.”
2. Genakos & Valletti (CEPR / Imperial College, 2015–2023 series)
   “A hypothetical symmetric four-to-three merger in mobile telecommunications raises average consumer bills by 16.3% in the long run, with effects ranging between 7% and 22% across the studied European democracies.”
3. John Kwoka (Northeastern University, cumulative meta-analysis of 1,900+ merger retrospectives, 2023)
   “Approximately 80–83 % of consummated mergers that have been studied retrospectively resulted in price increases, with an average increase of around 7.3 % and substantially higher effects in already concentrated markets.”
4. OECD Roundtable on Market Concentration (2018 & 2023)
   “Several studies suggest that an increase in market concentration is associated with an increase in prices and profit margins.”
5. European Central Bank (Cavalleri et al., Working Paper 2019 + subsequent ECB updates 2024)
   “A 1,000-point increase in the HHI is associated with price increases of 11–18 % in euro-area countries – an effect that proves highly consistent across member states.”
6. Bundeskartellamt Germany – Food Retail Sector Inquiry 2024
   “The four largest food retailers together hold more than 85 % of the market. This very high concentration is one of the main reasons why consumer prices in Germany – despite similar wholesale costs – are significantly higher than in France or Spain.”

The 2025 Oligopoly League Table: Israel #1

This ranking is approximate and synthesized from OECD-PMR indicators, HHI and CR4/CR5 values across the key consumer-facing sectors (food retail, banking, telecom, aviation). No single uniform global metric exists, data are sector-specific and sometimes dated, but the overall picture is unambiguous. The aggregative approximation was executed by Grok (expert modus).

Rank	Country	Key Evidence	Main Sources
1	Israel	Highest documented markups and concentration in food retail & banking	OECD 2025, Bank of Israel 2023–2025
2	Canada	Telecom CR3 > 90 %, banking CR5 > 90 %, food retail CR3 ≈ 75 %	CRTC, Competition Bureau Canada 2024
3	Australia	Banking “Big Four” > 80 %, telecom CR3 ≈ 92 %, food retail CR2 ≈ 70 %	ACCC 2024, OECD PMR 2023
4	Germany	Food retail CR4 ≈ 85 %, telecom CR3 ≈ 85 %	Bundeskartellamt 2024
5	Switzerland	Food retail CR2 ≈ 80 %, banking highly concentrated	WEKO 2024
6	Netherlands	Food retail CR4 ≈ 85 %	ACM 2024
7	Sweden	Food retail CR3 ≈ 90 %	Swedish Competition Authority 2024
8	United States	Many consumer sectors CR4 > 70 %, strong upward trend since 2000	DOJ/FTC, De Loecker et al.
9	United Kingdom	Food retail CR4 ≈ 70 %, banking Big Four ≈ 75 %	CMA 2024
10	Austria	Food retail CR4 ≈ 90 %	BWB 2024
11	Belgium	Food retail CR3 ≈ 80 %	BMA 2024
12	Finland	Food retail CR2 ≈ 85 %	FCCA 2024
13	New Zealand	Food retail near-duopoly ≈ 95 %	Commerce Commission NZ 2024
14	Norway	Food retail CR3 ≈ 98 %	Norwegian Competition Authority 2024
15	Japan	High concentration in several consumer-facing industries	JFTC 2024
16	South Korea	Chaebol-dominated sectors, moderate retail concentration	KFTC 2024
17	France	Banking & telecom concentrated, food retail less so than Germany	Autorité de la concurrence 2024
18	Italy	Fragmented retail, concentrated telecom/banking	AGCM 2024
19	Spain	Food retail noticeably more competitive than Germany/France	CNMC 2024
20	Portugal	Lowest concentration among larger European democracies	AdC 2024

Israel – The Clearest Textbook Example for an Oligopolistic Economy

Israel is a parliamentary democracy and simultaneously the OECD country with the highest market concentration in nearly all consumer-goods sectors. The consequences are dramatic and uniquely well-documented. Some speak of a socialist-styled economy.

Bank of Israel – various reports 2023–2025 (summary by VonNaftali)
High market concentration is repeatedly identified as one of the principal drivers of Israel’s high cost of living. Food retail, banking, and mobile services routinely show consumer prices 15–35% (and in food sometimes over 50%) higher than in comparable OECD democracies with lower concentration.

OECD Economic Survey: Israel 2025
“Removing barriers to domestic and foreign competition, in particular by easing import procedures and strengthening enforcement, would durably lower consumer prices and raise real incomes.”

Israel Competition Authority & OECD data 2024–2025 (summary by VonNaftali)
The two largest supermarket chains control roughly 65–70 % of the market. Food prices in Israel stood 52 % above the OECD average in mid-2024, even after the post-pandemic inflation wave had largely subsided elsewhere.

The “Cornflakes Law” (2014–2016) – A Large-Scale Natural Experiment: Failed

Triggered by the 2011 social protests and the infamous €8 box of Kellogg’s Cornflakes, Israel enacted the Law for Promoting Competition in the Food Market, which included:

• Elimination or drastic reduction of tariffs on thousands of food items
• Legalisation of parallel imports and recognition of foreign kosher supervision
• Ban on exclusive import agreements
• Mandatory shelf-space rules for small suppliers
• Strengthened powers for the Competition Authority

Yet the average grocery basket in 2025 remains 20–30 % (and in some categories still over 50%) more expensive than the European average. The NGO American Friends of Meir Panim wrote: “Israel’s “Cornflake Law” Means Crumbs for the Poor”. Israel is a rich nation and a rich state, but poor people.

“The market remains concentrated, reflecting the high levels of concentration in Israel’s food and consumer goods market.” (Bank of Israel quoted in: State Comptroller of Israel Annual Report 2024, p. 22) and “”The wholesale trade sector in Israel remains highly concentrated for food products. Three food suppliers account for 84% of the market in 20 consumer products and importing is similarly concentrated (State Comptroller, 2024).” (OECD Economic Surveys: Israel 2025, p. 123)

Approximately 150 major food importers have not transitioned to the “European path,” continuing to use a more expensive and regular import route, according to the Israeli State Comptroller’s 2024 annual report. This is because they are able to pass the increased costs onto consumers due to a lack of sufficient market competition. The report implies that this practice stifles new importers who may not be able to afford to absorb these costs.

The State Comptroller’s 2024 report highlighted that major, established food importers have largely avoided using this new, more efficient “European path,” preferring the older, more expensive “regular path”. This behavior indicates a lack of sufficient competition in the Israeli food market, allowing these companies to pass the additional costs of the older import method onto consumers without fear of losing market share to rivals (such as new importers who might use the cheaper method).

Conclusion – The Burden of Proof Has Reversed

Tommaso Valletti (former Chief Competition Economist, European Commission), Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 2024
“Structural presumptions are grounded on solid economics… They establish that all mergers above certain concentration thresholds are illegal unless the merging parties can prove that merger-specific efficiencies will be passed on to consumers in tangible form.”

John Kwoka, ProMarket, October 2024
“After decades of retrospective research showing that the overwhelming majority of mergers raise prices, the burden of proof has decisively shifted: further concentration must now be presumed harmful to consumers unless extraordinary evidence to the contrary is produced – evidence that has essentially never materialised in any developed democracy.”

In developed democracies, oligopolies do not “sometimes” raise prices. They raise prices virtually without exception and always. Israel remains the most vivid, best-documented, and still ongoing proof. Without reform of the economic structures, the costs of living in Israel will stay high and even raise. To change this, a reform is needed. However, it will be likely shot down by the deep state.

Tools used for research, translation, proof reading, verification of codes/equations, pic generation etc.: LLMs / SE / BusinessSoftware / Parsers / DB/ Websites etc. All articles: Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs).