Justicial Reform in Israel: “We have the authority….” – A Logical Investigation of a Twisted Claim in Two Versions – 'VonNaftali' – Blog on Business, Science&more. Made in Israel.

Frame&Background

The sentence under examination – “We have the authority both to determine that we have authority, and to determine that we do not have authority” – is not a mere theoretical curiosity. It touches the very heart of political and legal philosophy: the problem of self-referential authority, the legitimacy of power, and the limits of institutional self-justification. Additionally, this authority denies to be hold responsible. In short: An authority which claims to be the highest authority without being hold responsible and without being elected.

The sentence under examination is not a hypothetical philosophical construct. It is a close paraphrase of a position repeatedly asserted by Israel’s Supreme Court (High Court of Justice) during the bitter judicial reform crisis of 2023–2026.

Senior justices, most notably Court President Isaac Amit, have explicitly maintained that the Court itself possesses the ultimate authority to determine the scope of its own powers — including the power to decide whether it may review and invalidate laws passed by the elected Knesset.

This stance became particularly prominent in the landmark January 2024 ruling that struck down the “Reasonableness Amendment” and in subsequent decisions in which the Court rejected attempts by the government and parliament to limit judicial oversight. In effect, the justices argued that they alone hold the final say on the boundaries of judicial authority — precisely the self-referential claim encapsulated in the sentence.

The formulation has therefore become a focal point of fierce public and political controversy in Israel. Critics, including Justice Minister Yariv Levin and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, but not Prime Minister Beyain Netanyahu, have described it as the ultimate expression of judicial self-empowerment — an unelected body claiming the right to define and expand its own powers at the expense of the democratically elected branches of government. Such claims frequently appear in debates about constitutional courts, sovereign power, or any body that asserts the right to define the scope of its own competence.

The following analysis demonstrates that this statement is logically untenable. It is presented first in ordinary philosophical language and then in the formal framework of deontic logic.

1. In Philosophical Language

The claim fails in both possible outcomes:

If the group uses this authority to declare that it does have authority, the argument becomes a vicious circle (begging the question): it assumes the very authority it claims to prove.
If the group uses this authority to declare that it does not have authority, it directly contradicts itself: something that has no authority cannot validly determine that it has no authority.

In either case, the statement undermines itself. It is a classic self-refuting paradox, comparable to the Liar Paradox (“This sentence is false”).

Conclusion: The claim is logically untenable. It cannot be consistently true.

2. In Deontic Logic Formalization

Let $A$ stand for the proposition: “The group possesses normative authority.”

Let $\text{Det}(\phi)$ stand for the act of authoritatively determining that $\phi$ holds.

Let $P(\alpha)$ mean: “It is permitted to perform act $\alpha$ .”

The original claim is formalized as:

$P(\text{Det}(A)) \land P(\text{Det}(\neg A))$

Basic Axioms

To analyze authority properly, we introduce two fundamental axioms of any consistent normative or legal system:

Axiom of Jurisdictional Validity (V): $\text{Det}(\phi) \rightarrow A$ (An authoritative determination can only be valid if the agent actually possesses authority.)
Axiom of Success (S): $\text{Det}(\phi) \rightarrow \phi$ (If an authoritative determination is successfully made, the determined state of affairs holds.)

Derivation of the Paradox

Suppose the group exercises the permission $P(\text{Det}(\neg A))$ .

The Act: $\text{Det}(\neg A)$ is performed.
By Axiom (S): $\text{Det}(\neg A) \rightarrow \neg A$ .Result: The group now has no authority.
By Axiom (V): $\text{Det}(\neg A) \rightarrow A$ .Requirement: The group must have possessed authority to make the determination.

This leads to a direct contradiction: $A \land \neg A$ .

The permission $P(\text{Det}(\neg A))$ is therefore self-extinguishing: once used, it destroys the very precondition (authority) required for its own validity.

Conclusion: The statement is not merely a contradiction of duties; it is a meta-level inconsistency.

The second part ( $P(\text{Det}(\neg A))$ ) is a performative suicide: the success of the act logically falsifies the condition of its own validity.

The first part ( $P(\text{Det}(A))$ ) is a vicious circle.

Final Verdict: The claim is logically untenable. It treats authority simultaneously as both a premise and a variable, rendering any stable truth value for the system impossible.

Q.E.D.

3. Similar Paradoxes and the Suitability of Deontic Logic

This kind of self-referential paradox is not new. It belongs to a well-known family of logical and normative paradoxes:

The Liar Paradox (“This sentence is false”) – a classic self-refuting statement.
The Epimenides Paradox (“All Cretans are liars” spoken by a Cretan).
The Sovereignty Paradox (“Who has the authority to limit the sovereign’s authority?”).
Russell’s Paradox in set theory, which forced a fundamental revision of the foundations of mathematics.

What makes the present sentence particularly interesting is that it operates in the normative domain – the realm of authority, permission, and obligation. This is precisely why deontic logic is the most appropriate tool for its analysis.

Deontic logic is the branch of modal logic that formalizes normative concepts such as obligation (( O )), permission (( P )), and prohibition. It was developed in the 20th century by scholars such as Georg Henrik von Wright and is widely used in legal philosophy, ethics, and constitutional theory because it can model the internal consistency of normative systems. Unlike pure propositional logic, deontic logic explicitly addresses what agents are allowed or obliged to do, making it ideal for examining claims about the scope and limits of authority.

In this case, deontic logic reveals the deep structural flaw: the sentence does not merely assert a factual contradiction; it asserts a normative self-undermining. It grants a permission that, when exercised, immediately cancels the very normative foundation on which the permission rests.

No coherent normative system can tolerate such a permission without collapsing. Deontic logic therefore does not merely describe the inconsistency – it explains why the inconsistency is fatal to the legitimacy of the claimed authority.

Tools used for research, translation, proof reading, verification of codes/equations, pic generation etc.: LLMs / SE / BusinessSoftware / Parsers / DB/ Websites etc. All articles: Creative Commons BY-NC-ND 4.0 (Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs). Pic AI generated: illustrative.